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Common Ground With A Common Faith: Dewey’s 
Idea of the “Religious”
Bradley Baurain
Abstract
In A Common Faith, Dewey rejects organized religion and belief in the supernatu-
ral, instead arguing for an authentically “religious” attitude which this interpretive 
essay analyzes in terms of four propositions: 1) Knowledge is unifi ed. 2) Knowledge 
is democratic. 3) Th e pursuit of moral ideals requires moral faith. 4) Th e authority 
for moral ideals is experience as explored via inquiry. Th e author responds from 
the perspective of his own religious faith and outlines conceptual relationships with 
modern spirituality in education writers. Th e common ground is that the “religious” 
must be seen as a signifi cant way of being and becoming in education.
American philosopher John Dewey (1897), articulating his beliefs about education 
in “My Pedagogic Creed,” concludes with these words:
 I believe, fi nally, that the teacher is engaged, not simply in the training 
of individuals, but in the formation of the proper social life.
 I believe that every teacher should realize the dignity of his calling; that 
he is a social servant set apart for the maintenance of proper social order 
and the securing of the right social growth.
 I believe that in this way the teacher always is the prophet of the true 
God and the usherer in of the true kingdom of God. (p. 95)
Given that Dewey moved steadily away from organized religion during his life, 
what does he mean by this rather dramatic closing statement? Who is the “true 
God”? What is the “true kingdom of God”? And what does it mean for a teacher 
to be a “prophet”?
Common Ground With A Common Faith: Dewey’s Idea of the “Religious”     75
Volume 27 (2)  2011
Th e answers to these questions are found in his work, A Common Faith (1934). 
Th ough this book has been criticized, mostly in passing, its ideas and arguments 
have only rarely been analyzed. Scholars tend to summarize A Common Faith and 
Dewey’s thoughts on religion briefl y on their way elsewhere. Only a handful of ar-
ticles in the past fi ft een years or so have expended signifi cant eff ort on A Common 
Faith (including Noddings, 2009), and I would argue that none of them have made 
explicating the specifi cs of Dewey’s positions and arguments a top priority. One of 
the intended contributions of this essay is thus a more substantial exploration of 
the details of Dewey’s thinking in this area. 
In this slim volume, Dewey (1934) works to set up a middle way through what 
he sees as an oppositional gulf between traditional organized religion and modern 
advances in science (p. 28). Th is middle way he calls “religious”—some today might 
call it “spiritual.” Th e religious is characterized by a rejection of creeds, doctrines, 
rituals, and other elements of organized religion. Instead, an authentically religious 
attitude or orientation is existential and humanist. Moral faith rests not upon a di-
vine Supreme Being or divinely revealed truths, but upon the dynamic potential 
of inquiry to discover knowledge and pursue ideals, that is, to act on experiential 
knowledge in order to improve life. In education, such issues are marginalized 
within current educational policy discussions, which emphasize more quantifi -
able matters such as achievement gaps in standardized test scores and the value 
of college degrees as socioeconomic credentials. Even so, many view a generalized 
spirituality —which I will describe as akin though not identical to Dewey’s idea of 
the religious—as a neglected but essential element of learning in schools. Th is can 
be seen, for example, in a recent special theme section (six articles in all) in Teachers 
College Record entitled “Present to Possibility: Th e Classroom as a Spiritual Space” 
(Miller, 2009), as well as in the work of several writers mentioned later in this essay.
With regard to terminology, it must be noted that Dewey (1934) himself used 
the word “spiritual” only a handful of times in A Common Faith, never prominently. 
In context, his uses of spiritual suggest a variety of nontechnical meanings and as-
sociations, including “immaterial,” “moral,” “aesthetic,” and “sacred.” Nonetheless, 
as will be seen, current use of the term spiritual, especially by some spirituality in 
education writers, interrelates well with key elements of Dewey’s idea of the religious 
as discussed here. So while this essay does not assume religious and spiritual mean 
the same, a strong conceptual connection is outlined between Dewey’s idea of the 
religious and modern descriptions of the spiritual in education.
Th ere is discontinuity as well, however. With regard to both spirituality and 
religion in education, it is worth returning to Dewey’s ideas and arguments be-
cause he identifi es key issues and takes a stand on them, even or especially if they 
are controversial. Current spirituality in education writers, on the other hand, 
tend to avoid such bold encounters, preferring a more ecumenical or inclusive ap-
proach. For example, as will be seen, Dewey rejects belief in the supernatural, and 
his rejection is accompanied by reasons, illustrations, analysis, and consequences. 
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Whether or not a supernatural world exists is obviously a signifi cant issue, yet one 
rarely fi nds modern spirituality in education writers taking a defi nite position re-
garding it, much less discussing such a position in depth. From my perspective, one 
of the eff ects of such opacity is to mask diversity and blunt the meaningfulness of 
potential dialogue.
Th e central purpose of this essay, then, is to analyze Dewey’s understudied 
A Common Faith and from it to take the measure of his arguments regarding the 
religious. Th e importance of doing so is found primarily but not only in the con-
cepts themselves. In addition, several critical responses to Dewey are made from 
my own perspective as a religious (specifi cally, evangelical Christian) believer, and 
these movements toward dialogue also hold value. Finally, both the exposition and 
the critiques are signifi cant in light of the relative absence of Deweyan religious or 
spiritual priorities from current mainstream discourse on education. Conceptual 
relationships are outlined between Dewey’s description of the religious and current 
descriptions of spirituality in education in order to highlight the ongoing signifi -
cance of these issues. Th e foundational argument is that Dewey is working with 
important insights, chief among them the belief that human beings are moral and 
spiritual beings, and consequently, that learning and education are best pursued in 
ways that seek to understand and respect these qualities and dimensions of human 
nature and experience. Given that the religious or spiritual currently hovers at the 
fringes of education policy and practice (as opposed to being widely understood or 
respected), this essay is a timely call to reinvigorate education with these important 
and meaningful themes.  
Brief Background
Dewey scholars have chronicled a shift  in his thinking about religion, namely, 
Christianity—as the religion with which he was by far most familiar—during the 
late 1880s and early 1890s (Wirth, 1965; Rockefeller, 1991). While at the Univer-
sity of Michigan, he joined a liberal Congregationalist church (the denomination 
in which he had been raised), worked actively with the Student Christian Asso-
ciation, and taught Bible classes at his church. During this time, he attempted to 
keep his ideas within the fold of organized religion, for example, by interpreting 
Hegel as parallel in meaning with Christian theology. Over the years, however, 
Dewey moved away from traditional Christianity toward a more secular human-
istic viewpoint—variously referred to as scientifi c humanism (Wirth, 1965), demo-
cratic humanism, religious humanism (Rockefeller, 1991), pragmatic humanism, 
or existential humanism (Noddings, 1993).
Even as he gradually abandoned organized religion, however, Dewey did not 
reject the idea of the religious but instead worked to extract such an idea from what 
he saw as the outdated burdens of ritual and dogma: “While he relinquished an 
orthodox religious orientation, he [continued] to insist on the prime importance of 
the spiritual and religious quality of experience” (Wirth, 1965, p. 267). As he says 
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in a letter, one of his main purposes in writing A Common Faith was to reach out 
to people who felt attracted to the spirit of religion but not to organized religion it-
self: “My book was written for the people who feel inarticulately that they have the 
essence of the religious with them and yet are repelled by the religions” (quoted in 
Webster, 2009, p. 622).
Dewey’s Rejection of Belief in the Supernatural
Dewey’s (1934) fi rst and perhaps most signifi cant move in defi ning religious is a 
rejection of the supernatural. He aims to keep religious values while getting rid of 
the untenable baggage of supernatural beliefs. To him, as to many others before and 
since, it is simply obvious that belief in the supernatural is not credible in the mod-
ern world (p. 30). It is in fact an “encumbrance” and the “genuinely religious” needs 
“purifi cation” or “emancipation” (p. 8) from it in order to grow and develop in ways 
benefi ting humanity (p. 2). He appears to argue for the discarding of this belief in 
two ways: First, because religions around the world vary considerably in their con-
ception of a supernatural realm and people’s relationship to it, he concludes that the 
“supernatural” must be a socially generated concept rather than actual fact (pp. 3-6). 
If the supernatural were real, he reasons, there would be more similarities and cohe-
siveness in how religions conceive and describe it. Th e bottom line is that “there is no 
such thing as religion in the singular. Th ere is only a multitude of religions” (p. 7).
Second, Dewey (1934) suggests that belief in the supernatural, as a socially 
generated concept, stems from past human inability to understand or explain nat-
ural phenomena (pp. 13, 56-57). Given the modern discoveries of science and the 
tools of scientifi c inquiry, humanity no longer needs recourse to the supernatural 
for explanatory purposes. Th is is not to say that everything has been explained or 
that humanity will ever reach a state in which everything has been explained, but 
that we now know enough to put our faith in the ability of scientifi c inquiry to bring 
about a growing comprehension of presently mysterious phenomena.  
Dewey remained committed to these views in later years (Rockefeller, 1991). 
In his contribution to a symposium on “Religion and the Intellectuals” in Th e Par-
tisan Review (Dewey, 1950), for example, he repeats several points from A Common 
Faith, prominently including rejection of belief in the supernatural. Concluding 
his essay, he asks: “Assuming that in the past religions nourished certain vital hu-
man values, can these values now be maintained without a widespread belief in 
the supernatural?” (p. 394). Answering in the affi  rmative, he argues that insofar as 
religious beliefs in the supernatural have been “the source of violent confl ict, and 
destructive of basic human values,” such beliefs must now be abandoned if more 
humanistic “religious values” are to grow and fl ourish: “Freedom from it [belief in 
the supernatural] will provide an opportunity for a religious experience to develop 
that is deeply and pervasively human and humane” (p. 394).
How persuasive are Dewey’s arguments for rejecting belief in the supernatu-
ral? We perhaps fi nd a hint in Noddings’s (2009) description of A Common Faith 
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as “arguably one of John Dewey’s least eff ective books” (p. 12). In Dewey’s fi rst ar-
gument above, it is curious that he takes diversity to be evidence against a belief, 
since elsewhere in his philosophy he fi nds multiplicity and diversity to be in general 
positive and productive (Meinhart, 2002). Furthermore, although he contends that 
inconsistencies and contradictions are all that world religions have in common—
“the diff erences among them are so great and so shocking that any common ele-
ment that can be extracted is meaningless” (Dewey, 1934, p. 8)—he nonetheless 
goes on to distill the meaning of religious out of the domain of organized religion. 
Noting this apparent contradiction, Noddings (2009) points out that sociologists 
and other scholars generally reject this claim and feel quite confi dent in identify-
ing certain elements of religion in general, including but not limited to belief in the 
supernatural (pp. 12-13). 
With reference to Dewey’s second argument against belief in the supernatu-
ral, his historical account of such beliefs as necessitated by ignorance concerning 
natural phenomena seems disingenuous. It implies that the sole or primary social 
function of organized religion is to explain the presently unexplainable. Th is is by no 
means a given, not even from an anthropological or sociological standpoint, much 
less from the insider perspectives of religions themselves. Beyond the idea of reli-
gion’s potential explanatory power, religious believers have provided and continue 
to provide a variety of grounds for belief in a supernatural world (for contemporary 
examples, see Craig, 2008). Furthermore, there is nothing about scientifi c under-
standing that would necessarily displace the idea of the supernatural. Th at is, unless 
belief in the supernatural consists only in belief in certain explanations of natural 
phenomena, which it does not, or unless the “natural” is posited to encompass all 
of existence, which begs the question, no amount of scientifi c knowledge or expla-
nation would logically require disbelief in a supernatural realm. So it appears that 
Dewey, in saying that new knowledge has superseded old beliefs and thus that belief 
in the supernatural is no longer credible, is working from prima facie assumptions 
rather than craft ing arguments as such. In addition, it must be noted that his rejec-
tion of the supernatural was neither original nor, from an academic perspective, 
extreme. Even so, Dewey’s identifi cation of this issue as essential in his extraction 
of the religious from religion is important, as it remains to the present day at the 
heart of many religious-secular worldview diff erences.
Dewey’s Idea of the “Religious”
From this starting point, then, what does Dewey mean by “religious”? Once the 
religious has been freed from supernatural beliefs and their stultifying baggage, 
what remains? More than a decade before writing A Common Faith, Dewey (1922) 
had, in Human Nature and Conduct, already begun to outline his later answers to 
these questions:
Religion has lost itself in cults, dogmas and myths. Consequently the of-
fi ce of religion as sense of community and one’s place in it has been lost . . . 
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Religion as a sense of the whole is the most individualized of all things, 
the most spontaneous, undefi nable and varied. For individuality signifi es 
unique connections in the whole. Yet it has been perverted into something 
uniform and immutable. It has been formulated into fi xed and defi ned 
beliefs expressed in required acts and ceremonies. Instead of marking the 
freedom and peace of the individual as a member of an infi nite whole, it 
has been petrifi ed into a slavery of thought and sentiment. (pp. 330-331)
In other words, organized religion as a social institution is missing the point and has 
become bogged down in creeds, doctrines, and scriptures. Rather than “cults, dog-
mas and myths . . . acts and ceremonies,” the genuinely “religious” is about a “sense 
of the whole” and especially “the individual as a member of an infi nite whole.” Th at 
is to say, the real point of religion is or should be the relationships among people 
(both as individuals and in community) and the universe, including the proper 
ends of such relationships. 
Th is emphasis emerges more clearly and in more developed form in A Com-
mon Faith. Dewey (1934) here conceives of the religious as signifying and embody-
ing harmony and wholeness within and among individuals, communities, and the 
universe in general (pp. 18-20). It is both an inner and an outer reality: “Th e self is 
always directed toward something beyond itself and so its own unifi cation depends 
upon the idea of the integration of the shift ing scenes of the world into that imagina-
tive totality we call the Universe” (p. 19). Th e universe is in turn “the embodiment 
for sense and thought of that encompassing scope of existence the intellect cannot 
grasp. It is the matrix within which our ideal aspirations are born and bred. It is the 
source of the values that the moral imagination projects as directive criteria and 
as shaping purposes” (p. 85). From this vantage point, authentic religious faith is 
understood to be morally purposeful, nothing less than “the unifi cation of the self 
through allegiance to inclusive ideal ends, which imagination presents to us and to 
which the human will responds as worthy of controlling our desires and choices” (p. 
33). To paraphrase, people are truly religious if they pursue higher purposes which 
are inherently worthy and compelling enough to unify their identities and govern 
their actions. Such purposes lie beyond what the intellect alone can grasp and be-
long instead to the moral imagination, which might be seen as an amalgamation 
of vision, conscience, and empathy. “Such a faith,” concludes Dewey, “has always 
been implicitly the common faith of mankind” (p. 87).
Dewey’s conception of the religious is certainly “not easy to understand” 
(Noddings, 2009, p. 13). Perhaps this is why little extended analysis of it has been 
done. Unpacking Dewey’s idea of the religious in this section of the essay, I suggest 
that it can be portrayed as having four main characteristics or requiring agree-
ment with four main propositions. Th ese four propositions underlie his concept of 
the religious and constitute an interpretive analysis of the main ideas in A Com-
mon Faith (Dewey, 1934), occasionally enhanced by references to other of Dewey’s 
works. First, knowledge is unifi ed. Ideally, knowledge can be and should be one 
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body. Forms of knowledge should not be separated from one another (pp. 34-35). 
Th e scientifi c and the religious should not be regarded as divided—as, to take but 
one recent example, within Stephen Jay Gould’s widely known framework of “non-
overlapping magisteria” (NOMA) (Ecklund, 2011)—but rather as joined or over-
lapping areas for inquiry and understanding. For example, some religious mystical 
experiences are susceptible to scientifi c (that is, physical and material) explanations 
(pp. 35-38). Th e wholeness and oneness of all forms of knowledge are to be appre-
hended through experience. From Dewey’s perspective, the authentically religious 
holds the potential to unify the natural, scientifi c, moral, and social dimensions of 
experience. Once properly understood, “religion would then be found to have its 
natural place in every aspect of human experience that is concerned with estimate 
of possibilities, with emotional stir by possibilities as yet unrealized, and with all 
action in behalf of their realization. All that is signifi cant in human experience falls 
within this frame” (p. 57).  
Second, knowledge is democratic. Th at is, knowledge is public and inquiry is 
a public process (pp. 39-41). Anyone may call any truth into question at any time 
and seek to verify or disprove it. Th e “supreme loyalty” is not to a fi xed body of im-
mutable truths but rather to “the method by which truth is obtained” (p. 39)—that 
is, the method of scientifi c (i.e., rational or intelligent) inquiry. By contrast, Dewey 
describes organized religion as resting on “limited and private” knowledge (divine 
revelation, mystical experiences) and maintaining power by suppressing democ-
racy and inquiry and promoting fear (divine punishment) (p. 39). A democratic 
ideal is subverted by the circular nature of traditional religion’s reasoning (pp. 40-
41): religious experiences must yield results which fi t into previously known reli-
gious truths (creeds, doctrines, scriptures). If they do not, they are rejected as not 
genuinely religious. So such experiences are either confi rmatory or thrown out as 
evidence, meaning that they are not testable or verifi able and that the meanings 
of such experiences are foreordained and fi xed. From Dewey’s perspective, this is 
simply wrong. Religious experience must abandon fossilized creedal commitments 
and become democratically open to processes of inquiry (like all forms of experi-
ence). Only via open inquiry can the deeper, more vital meanings of truly religious 
experience be envisioned and discovered. 
Tröhler (2000) sees Dewey’s idea of the religious as outlined in A Common 
Faith as key to how he viewed democracy working: It addresses key issues of moral 
values and individual-community relationships without which democratic societies 
could not cohere or move in morally purposeful directions. So just as the religious 
needs a democratic process of inquiry in order to be freed from the trap of institu-
tional religion, so also does democracy itself need religious experience, attitudes, 
and values in order to fl ourish.
Th ird, the pursuit of moral ideals requires moral faith. “Moral faith” is a prag-
matic trust in inquiry, process, and experience, as opposed to the “intellectual as-
sent” to creeds and customs required by traditional religions (pp. 21-23). As Dewey 
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explains: “Faith in the continued disclosing of truth through directed cooperative 
human endeavor is more religious in quality than is any faith in a completed rev-
elation” (p. 26). Such faith is also a commitment to moral principles and ideals that 
promote the betterment of self and society. It can and should be sacrifi cial in the 
sense formerly reserved for organized religion: “Any activity pursued in behalf of an 
ideal end against obstacles and in spite of threats of personal loss because of convic-
tion of its general and enduring value is religious in quality” (p. 27). In fact, if only 
people were “actuated throughout the length and breadth of human relations with 
the faith and ardor that have at times marked historic religions the consequences 
[i.e., social benefi ts] would be incalculable” (pp. 80-81). One implication of this is 
that the religious is not a permanent possession but an evolving process or journey. 
In organized religion, according to Dewey (1930), “‘morals’ were conceived as a code 
of laws, the same everywhere and at all times. Th e good life was one lived in fi xed 
adherence to fi xed principles. In contrast with all such beliefs, the outstanding fact in 
all branches of natural science is that to exist is to be in process, in change” (p. 271). 
Webster (2009) aptly summarizes: “Religion was not to be regarded as something a 
person could have but rather as something that a person becomes as a way of living 
. . . Religious faith is therefore signifi cant not because it is embedded in knowledge 
statements which are ‘true’ but rather they are personally important end-purposes 
which determine our conduct and way-of-being in all of our experiences” (p. 624).
Fourth, as previously implied, the authority for moral ideals is experience as ex-
plored via inquiry. As elsewhere in Dewey, the term “experience” in A Common Faith 
(1934) is a shorthand reference for the various dimensions of interactions among 
people and their contexts (e.g., pp. 3, 9, 19). As he explains in Democracy and Educa-
tion (1916), experience “primarily consists of the active relations subsisting between 
a human being and his natural and social surroundings” (pp. 319-320). Experience 
is what gives meaning to existence: “In just the degree in which connections are 
established between what happens to a person and what he does in response, and 
between what he does to his environment and what it does in response to him, his 
acts and the things about him acquire meaning” (p. 320). Th is meaning is authorita-
tive in the sense that experience can provide worthy and compelling purposes and 
ideals by which to live. It does so, however, in a way that is more democratic and 
open-ended than the authority wielded by organized religion. As Dewey elaborates 
in “What I Believe” (1930): “Adherence to any body of doctrines and dogmas based 
upon a specifi c authority signifi es distrust in the power of experience to provide, in 
its own ongoing movement, the needed principles of belief and action. Faith in its 
newer sense signifi es that experience itself is the sole ultimate authority” (p. 267). 
For Dewey, the reason for the qualitative diff erences between the authority 
of organized religion and the authority of experience is the process of scientifi c in-
quiry. Such inquiry is the ground of truth. Th e true loyalty of a religious orientation 
is thus to a method of inquiry rather than to a set body of revealed truths (Dewey, 
1934, p. 39). Dewey explains: “new methods of inquiry and refl ection have become 
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for the educated man today the fi nal arbiter of all questions of fact, existence, and 
intellectual assent . . . Th ere is but one sure road of access to truth—the road of pa-
tient, cooperative inquiry operating by means of observation, experiment, record 
and controlled refl ection” (pp. 31-32). Dewey is confi dent that this road leads to 
moral values that do not need the support of organized religion: “Th e validity of 
justice, aff ection, and that intellectual correspondence of our ideas with realities 
that we call truth, is so assured in its hold upon humanity that it is unnecessary for 
the religious attitude to encumber itself with the apparatus of dogma and doctrine” 
(p. 44). Th e progress of humanity would, in fact, be better served by severing alto-
gether the connection between moral ideals and organized religion: “Th e opposi-
tion between religious values as I conceive them and religions is not to be bridged. 
Just because the release of these values is so important, their identifi cation with the 
creeds and cults of religions must be dissolved” (p. 28; see also pp. 77-81). In short, 
humanity no longer needs faith in gods or God to make sense of experience or to 
envision and pursue knowledge and moral ideals. Dewey (1930) thus predicts that 
“the future of religion is connected with the possibility of developing a faith in the 
possibilities of human experience and human relationships that will create a vital 
sense of the solidarity of human interests and inspire action to make that sense a 
reality” (pp. 273-274; see also Rockefeller, 1991, pp. 489-490). 
In summary, Dewey believed that the authentically religious consists in a be-
lief in the wholeness or oneness of knowledge; a commitment to democracy rather 
than hierarchy or authority with regard to determining what counts as knowledge 
and truth; a moral faith that is governed not by the socially generated, outdated 
dogma and rituals of traditional religion, but rather by a process-driven sense of 
the harmony and mystery of the universe and our place in it, and an engagement 
with experience and inquiry as the surest foundations for rational thinking and 
social progress toward moral ideals.
What Liberating the “Religious” from “Religion” Changes
While rejecting the supernatural and doctrinal content of the vocabulary of orga-
nized religion, Dewey does attempt to co-opt or reconstruct this vocabulary in A 
Common Faith (1934) and elsewhere. “God” is suggested to mean not a personal, 
supernatural, Supreme Being but “the ideal ends that at a given time and place one 
acknowledges as having authority over his volition and emotion, the values to which 
one is supremely devoted, as far as these ends, through imagination, take on unity” 
(p. 42). In the terms of my previous paraphrase, God is a shorthand way of naming 
the higher purposes which experience and inquiry reveal—by virtue of their unify-
ing and morally admirable eff ects—as worthy of our allegiance. Put another way, 
God is “a relationship between the actual and the ideal . . . the ongoing creation of 
human eff ort as ideals are acted on in pursuit of desires” (Meinhart, 2002, p. 346). 
Dewey (1934) persistently reminds us that ideals require action: “there are forces in 
nature and society that generate and support the ideals. Th ey are further unifi ed by 
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the action that gives them coherence and solidity. It is this active relation between 
ideal and actual to which I would give the name ‘God’” (p. 51). Th us, God is created 
in our image rather than we in his. I agree with McCarthy’s (2002) analysis on this 
point: “Th e traditional ‘God’ concept, the supreme and supernaturally powerful 
Being, is eliminated, entirely, from Dewey’s position. What we have, instead, under 
the name ‘God,’ turns out to be simply human beings, working intelligently and 
cooperatively in the context of natural conditions, to bring cherished ideals into 
actuality” (p. 354). Historically speaking, posits Dewey, we have projected onto a 
supernatural being all the best qualities in human nature and experience in order to 
give them weight and authority. Th e actual sources of these moral ideals, however, 
are not divine but thoroughly human. Th e fact is that (Dewey, 1934):
all signifi cant ends and all securities for stability and peace have grown up 
in the matrix of human relations, and that the values given a supernatural 
locus are in fact products of an idealizing imagination that has laid hold of 
natural goods . . . [G]oods actually experienced in the concrete relations of 
family, neighborhood, citizenship, pursuit of art and science, are what men 
actually depend upon for guidance and support, and that their reference 
to a supernatural and other-worldly locus has obscured their real nature 
and has weakened their force. (pp. 70-71)
According to Dewey, the time has now come when such projections are no longer 
useful and ethics that are truly religious can and should be liberated from orga-
nized religion (pp. 72-74).
Other traditional religious vocabulary receives similar treatment. “Revelation” 
is not supernatural or scriptural but instead signifi es the ongoing process of human 
inquiry. Th e revelation of truth is thus necessarily ongoing, unfi nished, and partial 
(Wirth, 1965, p. 266). “Freedom in Christ” is not a consequence of divine redemp-
tion but instead means freedom to pursue such inquiry (Webster, 2009, p. 625). Th e 
“kingdom of God” highlighted at the conclusion of Dewey’s “My Pedagogic Creed” 
(1897, p. 95) is not about divine sovereignty or power but instead signifi es the moral 
ideals motivating a social struggle for human betterment (Webster, 2009, p. 627). 
One of Dewey’s motivations for co-opting or reconstructing religious terms in this 
way seems to have been to reach out via familiar language to the religious-but-wary-
of-religion group he perceived as growing more numerous among the American 
population (Webster, 2009). He does not actually argue in favor of use of the term 
“God,” for example, but only outlines the conception he does in order to assist those 
who might fi nd it helpful or less threatening to retain the word: “Use of the words 
‘God’ or ‘divine’ to convey the union of actual with ideal may protect man from a 
sense of isolation and from consequent despair or defi ance” (Dewey, 1934, p. 53).
Dewey’s co-opted or reconstructed use of the language of organized religion 
has spurred controversy. Rosenow (1997), for example, accuses Dewey of hijack-
ing religious language or of forcibly hammering round pegs of secular meaning 
into square holes of religious terminology. McCarthy (2002) calls Dewey’s strat-
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egy “a dangerous process of attempting to put the new wine of scientifi c thought 
into the old bottles of religious rhetoric” (p. 353). Webster (2009) defends Dewey as 
not intending to camoufl age or deceive, but rather as attempting to convey honest 
understandings of the deeper meanings of religious terms (p. 618). By extracting 
genuinely religious content from the tradition-encrusted terminology of organized 
religion, Dewey aimed to challenge the monopoly he perceived as being claimed by 
traditional religions upon religious experience (p. 622).
Once a living religious ideal has been extracted from the dead weight of 
organized religion, it will be free, Dewey (1934) argues, to grow and develop and 
improve human life. As he describes matters, within the framework of traditional 
religion, believers rely on God to act instead of acting themselves, and wait for a 
future heaven instead of embracing and working to improve present life and expe-
rience: “Men have never fully used the powers they possess to advance the good in 
life, because they have waited upon some power external to themselves and to na-
ture to do the work they are responsible for doing” (p. 46; see also Dewey, 1930, p. 
268). If God and heaven were removed from consideration, there would be enough 
“justice, kindliness, and order so that if it were mobilized for action, not expecting 
abrupt and complete transformation to occur, the disorder, cruelty, and oppression 
that exist would be reduced” (p. 47). Th at is, if humanity stopped blaming sin, rely-
ing on God, and looking forward to heaven, we would struggle more passionately 
and eff ectively to build a better world in the here and now (pp. 76-78). We would 
not settle for less in the present life or focus on the hope of a better life aft er death, 
but instead we would be fully committed in thought, word, and deed to the pursuit 
or accomplishment of moral ideals in our daily lives and relationships. Dewey’s ar-
gument has thus circled back to the original rejection of belief in the supernatural. 
According to Dewey: “Th e objection to supernaturalism is that it stands in the way 
of an eff ective realization of the sweep and depth of the implications of natural 
human relations. It stands in the way of using the means that are in our power to 
make radical changes in these relations” (p. 80). In other words, traditional reli-
gion’s belief in a supernatural world blocks the road to moral progress and human 
betterment in this world.
Responding to Dewey’s Portrayal of Christianity
How fair or accurate is Dewey’s portrayal of organized religion, especially, given 
his personal and cultural background, Christianity? Th is question is signifi cant in 
part because of Dewey’s prominence in philosophy and education—when a thinker 
this consequential argues such major points, responses are called for. In addition, 
evaluating and responding to Dewey’s arguments in A Common Faith is important 
because to do so has implications for ongoing debates about such issues as appro-
priate religious content (if any) in educational curricula, the role (if any) of religion 
in the public sphere, and the extent of religious and other freedoms in relation to 
concepts such as citizenship and democracy (Noddings, 1993, 2008; Nord, 2010). 
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From my perspective as an evangelical Christian, his descriptions or claims regard-
ing organized religion are too oft en inaccurate or unsatisfactory. While I do not 
claim to speak for evangelicals or Christians in general, neither is it true that my 
comments in this brief critique are idiosyncratic. My disagreements with Dewey’s 
rather monolithic depictions can for the purposes of this essay be discussed under 
two headings: the Christian believer’s orientations toward present social life and 
toward truth. 
First, with regard to the orientation toward present social life, Dewey repre-
sents religious believers as putting their hope in a future heaven and being uncom-
mitted to the present. Th ey blame sin for the evils and suff erings of this life and 
wait for God to do something about it rather than engaging in the present struggle 
for human betterment. Such pie-in-the-sky charges of escapism are not new and 
unfortunately there are and have been Christians who match this description. Yet 
much of the tide of church doctrine and history runs in the opposite direction. It 
is not simply that there are exceptions to the generalization, but that the gener-
alization itself does not appear valid. One need look no further than one of the 
opening lines of the Lord’s Prayer, with its appeal that God’s will be done on earth 
as it is in heaven (Matthew 6:10). Admired thinkers and activists from Augustine 
to William Wilberforce to Martin Luther King, Jr.—not to mention more divisive 
and controversial fi gures such as Jerry Falwell or Pat Robertson—have, for better 
or worse, engaged in the social issues of their day on the basis of their Christian 
faith. Believers, despite Dewey’s portrayal, do not in fact tend to treat this present 
life as an irrelevant preface to heaven. Why is this not the case? A life of genuine 
faith mandates that believers are never to be satisfi ed with “intellectual assent” to 
creeds and doctrines, but rather understand their faith as something to be lived out 
day by day. Sin is indeed a moral and spiritual factor at work in human experience, 
yet responses of faith include not only “waiting upon God” to act in the future but 
also actively struggling for goodness and justice in the here and now. Th is is not to 
say that all that is done in the name of religion or faith accomplishes such ideals, 
nor that Christian believers always agree on specifi c social issues. Th e point here 
is that Dewey’s depiction of Christianity and the behavior of Christian believers is 
oft en curiously blind to both doctrine and history. Th e Christian motif of journey 
or pilgrimage suggests that believers are or should be energetically engaged with 
present realities. Christian religious faith, like the moral faith described by Dewey, 
is not passive pie-in-the-sky but vitally involves the present pursuit of moral and 
spiritual ideals in relationships with others and with the created world.
Second, with regard to the issue of orientation toward truth, Dewey repre-
sents religious believers as blindly or passively receiving a fi xed body of divinely 
revealed dogma. As pointed out in the previous paragraph, the receiving of divine 
revelation is hardly passive. Intellectual assent is insuffi  cient—active agreement 
of the heart and will are also called for in ways that are intended to transform 
individuals and communities in both the present and the future. Furthermore, 
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revelation is not exhaustive, that is, religious believers do not see it as covering all 
possible knowledge. Reason and inquiry thus have key parts to play in relation to 
learning and knowledge. While faith and reason might exist in tension or para-
dox, there is no intention for them to part company. Apologists from the Apostle 
Paul in Athens (Acts 17) to philosopher William Lane Craig (2008) have argued 
rational grounds for religious belief. In addition, while Christianity does indeed 
rest on a foundation of authoritative divine revelation, that revelation is not above 
inquiry or investigation. To take just one example, canonization of Scripture is an 
area of Christian religious scholarship within which historical, cultural, theological, 
and textual concerns surrounding how we got our Bible are studied and debated. 
Within the fold of organized Christianity, there is room for process, experience, 
interpretation, contextualization, and even doubt—it has been said that doubt is 
faith with the courage to ask diffi  cult questions. (Th is is not to say that all Chris-
tians are comfortable talking this way.)
In the end, if Dewey argued that the religious must be extracted or liberated 
from traditional religion, then I am suggesting that the two should be, as it were, 
put back together. Dewey rests his faith upon inquiry and experience, but inquiry 
and experience can tell diff erent and perhaps irreconcilable tales, depending on 
who is doing the telling, how, when, where, why, to whom, and what assumptions 
and interpretive lenses are brought to bear. For Dewey to argue that inquiry and 
experience are suffi  cient in themselves to lead humanity on a journey of moral and 
social progress is from my perspective at best a leap of faith.
Common Ground:  Spirituality in Education
At the beginning of this essay, I framed its central purpose as analyzing A Com-
mon Faith—thus my eff orts to develop a nuanced exposition of Dewey’s idea of the 
religious. I also indicated that my responses to Dewey’s positions would in some 
regards be critical, given that I remain committed to the sorts of traditional reli-
gious beliefs he rejects. Yet it is my hope that the fi nal emphasis of this essay may 
be found in the “common ground” of the title. While my critiques might help set 
an agenda for meaningful discussion and debate, what is vitally important is that 
despite everything, common ground does exist between Dewey and religious be-
lievers. Genuine conversations need common ground.
One major dimension of the common ground is that human beings are moral 
and spiritual beings, and we ignore these dimensions at our peril, especially in pro-
cesses of learning and education. Being religious or spiritual is a valid and signifi -
cant way of being and becoming both in and out of the classroom, and spiritual 
aspects of experience are sure to be present, whether acknowledged or not, in all 
learning endeavors. A second key aspect of the common ground is that knowledge 
is unifi ed. To build walls between sacred and secular or between religious and sci-
entifi c or even between natural and supernatural—despite their potential useful-
ness as cognitive categories—is to set up false and misleading dichotomies. One 
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practical eff ect seems to me to be that religion and spirituality are oft en ghettoized 
or kept out of mainstream educational discussions. In any case, although I, unlike 
Dewey, do not see experience as able to bear the weight of faith or as possessing 
moral authority in and of itself, experience does play a key role in revealing and 
teaching truth not only to Deweyan humanists but to Christian believers as well: 
as discussed above, religious beliefs are not truly knowable to believers until they 
are put into practice in daily life.
Th ese areas of agreement also build common ground with theorists of spiri-
tuality in education, at least some of whom appear directly or indirectly to follow in 
the footsteps of Dewey.  Qualitative researchers such as those working in the area of 
children’s spirituality, for example, continue the project of describing the religious 
in humanist and existential terms rather than from the perspective of organized 
religion. Schoonmaker (2009)—whose article is in the special issue of Teachers Col-
lege Record referenced earlier (Miller, 2009)—writes that “spirituality refers to a way 
of being that includes the capacity of humans to see beyond ourselves, to become 
more than we are, to see mystery and wonder in the world around them, and to 
experience private and collective moments of awe, wonder, and transcendence” (p. 
2714). One can see here emphases on the relationships and interactions among in-
dividual, society, and natural world; on the role of the imagination in envisioning 
“inclusive ideal ends” that can make us “more than we are”; and on the quality of 
moral faith that is committed to process and inquiry above all. To draw out such 
conceptual connections is not to argue for a linear philosophical inheritance, much 
less to provide a complete overview of the spirituality in education literature, but 
rather to continue the exploration of Dewey’s (1934) hypothesis that meaningful 
“religious” faith is “the unifi cation of the self through allegiance to inclusive ideal 
ends, which imagination presents to us and to which the human will responds as 
worthy of controlling our desires and choices” (p. 33). Or, in my paraphrase, people 
are religious if they pursue higher purposes which are inherently worthy and com-
pelling enough to unify their identities and govern their actions.
Th e affi  nities among Dewey’s idea of the religious and current spirituality in 
education writers can be seen using examples suggested by three of the four propo-
sitions discussed in this essay. First, the idea that knowledge is unifi ed is part of what 
undergirds the work of Palmer (1993, 1998). He argues against divisions in knowl-
edge and sees inquiry and morality as joined: “I have come to see that knowledge 
contains its own morality, that it begins not in a neutrality but in a place of passion 
within the human soul. Depending on the nature of that passion, our knowledge 
will follow certain courses and head toward certain ends” (1993, p. 7). He is also 
concerned with the relationships and interactions among individuals and their com-
munities, especially their professional communities: “By spiritual I mean the diverse 
ways we answer the heart’s longing to be connected with the largeness of life—a 
longing that animates love and work, especially the work called teaching” (1998, p. 
5). In authentic teaching and learning, he argues, there is a wholeness of knowledge.
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Second, the idea that knowledge is democratic is refl ected in the writing of 
Block (2007, 2009), who explicitly agrees with Dewey about the “symbiotic” links 
among education, teaching, and the moral and spiritual underpinnings of democ-
racy (2007, p. 87). While current educational reforms emphasize standardized test-
ing and individual profi ciency, for instance, “it is to the development of individual 
potential in the context of social responsibility to which the democratic classroom 
in a democracy must give voice and not to the progress of the individual at the 
expense of the welfare and care of others” (2007, p. 49). Again: “Dewey believed 
that it was not knowledge that the schools must seek to develop, but the capacity 
for wisdom and responsibility. Th is eff ort required the acquisition of knowledge 
[through inquiry]” (2009, p. 53). In Block’s vision as in Dewey’s, then, education and 
democracy are essentially religious endeavors for the purpose of human betterment.
Th ird, the idea that the authority for moral ideals is experience as explored via 
inquiry is seen in Brown (2008). She claims that every teacher brings their religion 
into their lessons—not in the sense of organized religion, but in a more Deweyan 
sense: 
If one understands religion as it functions—as symbols, stories, institu-
tions, ethics, values, and practices that make life meaningful—then any 
teacher of the humanities, and to a certain extent the social and natural 
sciences, brings his or her religion into the classroom. Th rough what teach-
ers choose to include and emphasize and what we choose to exclude and 
de-emphasize, we display our view of the world and what we value. Further, 
through how we interact with students and the qualities of our relationships 
with them, we not only display our view of the world but also create it. (p. x)
In her narrative, it is clear that the “symbols, stories, institutions, ethics, values, 
and practices that make life meaningful” are not the fi xed creeds and burdensome 
rituals of organized religion, but rather that they represent a transmutation of such 
religion into existentially meaningful religious values and ideals. Since “how we 
interact with our students and the qualities of our relationships with them” are a 
key dimension of this, she recounts Buddhist parables as frames for her explora-
tions of building community in the classroom. Th ese parables and explorations 
persistently return to themes of process, inquiry, experience, moral faith, and the 
relationships and interactions among persons, communities, and the universe or 
natural world. It is no accident that her book fl ows from a course entitled Buddhism 
and the Environment.
A notable exception to these affi  nities or thematic threads is the fact that few 
current spirituality in education writers directly reject belief in the supernatural, as 
Dewey did. An exception is Garrison (2011), who identifi es himself as a “Deweyan 
naturalist” and begins defi ning spirituality in the same way, by rejecting the super-
natural: “I do not believe in the supernatural, simply the natural that we do not yet 
comprehend and perhaps never will.” Th e writers cited above, however, write out 
of, respectively, Christian (namely, Quaker or Friends), Jewish, and Buddhist tradi-
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tions. Th ere are also, of course, spirituality in education scholars who work from an 
avowedly secular or religiously agnostic perspective, such as Nash (2002). His ap-
proach to spirituality sounds humanist and existential, akin to Dewey’s idea of the 
religious: “Spirituality is the name I give to the never-ending struggle that for each 
one of us is inescapable: the need to provide satisfying answers to life’s most insis-
tent questions about meaning” (p. 20). He agreed with a graduate student who told 
him: “Your work as an educator is actually a religious vocation because it gives you 
a sense of transcendence. Your church is the university. Your sacrament is teaching. 
Your community of saints is made up of your students. And your prayer is when 
you carry on intense, revitalizing, give-and-take conversations in the classroom” 
(p. 5). Or, in Dewey’s similarly co-opted words: “Th e teacher always is the prophet 
of the true God and the usherer in of the true kingdom of God.”
Dewey’s Idea of the “Religious” in Schools
Th ough Dewey does not discuss teachers or schools at length in A Common Faith, 
education and a Deweyan spirituality have come to be linked and intertwined in 
part because schools are an obvious social location in which moral and spiritual is-
sues and ideals might be explored and addressed without promoting one organized 
religion over another (Noddings, 1993, 2008). Webster (2009) explains that Dewey 
promoted people’s “right to exercise their own intelligence in all of their activities 
through a new kind of faith which looked to experience rather than institutional 
authorities as the assumed guardians of entry to another realm. Th is emancipation 
is to be fostered by teachers through a democratic approach to education” (p. 625). 
Noddings (2009) frames this goal as “how to get people to think, refl ect, and analyze 
without insulting them or the traditions they treasure” (p. 18). She does not think 
religious believers must necessarily give up their creeds and rituals to do this—or 
to put it in the language of A Common Faith, she is unconvinced that the religious 
must be, though it certainly can be, emancipated from organized religion. As an 
example, Noddings (2008, 2009) suggests that students might be assigned to read 
Th e Creation (Wilson, 2006), which is written as a letter from the secular humanist 
author to a Southern Baptist pastor. Th ough their perceptions and beliefs regarding 
the natural world are very diff erent, the writer suggests that perhaps they can agree 
to work together to preserve it. 
Th e point of raising religious or spiritual issues in schools is to promote refl ec-
tion and inquiry on signifi cant questions: students must get the message that spiri-
tual ideals and values are important, and they must feel free and equipped to make 
informed choices concerning them. Teachers would obviously play a key role in this 
process. Little wonder, then, that Dewey (1897) calls teachers to be “the prophet[s] 
of the true God and the usherer[s] in of the true kingdom of God” (p. 95). So, what 
is this “true kingdom”? It is an understanding of what is authentic and necessary, 
and what is unnecessary and even harmful, about institutional religion as com-
pared to genuinely religious values, actions, and ideals. Th is includes a commitment 
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not to religious dogma but to the role of experience and inquiry in individual and 
social life. And what does it mean to be a “prophet” of such a “kingdom”? It is to 
invite, summon, and exhort others to heed and participate in this understanding. 
Finally, who or what is the “true God”? It is not a personal Supreme Being who has 
revealed truths such as heaven, but higher moral and spiritual purposes which are 
inherently worthy and compelling enough to unify human identities and govern 
our actions in this present life. Th is is Dewey’s idea of the religious and part of his 
vision for human progress.
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